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A firm’s production activities are often supported by non-production activities. Among 
these activities are administrative units including headquarters, which process 
information both within and between firms. Often firms physically separate such 
administrative units from their production activities and create stand alone Central 
Administrative Offices (CAO). However, having its activities in multiple locations 
potentially imposes significant internal firm face-to-face communication costs. What 
types of firms are more likely to separate out such functions? If firms do separate 
administration and production, where do they place CAOs and why? How often do firms 
open and close, or relocate CAOs?  This paper documents such firms’ decisions on their 
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1. Introduction 
Firms’ production activities are supported by various non-production activities such as 
management, marketing and administration. Such administrative and management 
activities play crucial roles including coordinating and monitoring production and 
purchasing services. While such administrative functions can be in principle performed at 
the same site where production takes place, many firms separate out such functions in 
favor of stand alone Central Administrative Offices (CAO) that include Headquarters 
(HQ) offices. Administration, when separated from production activities, can incur 
significant communications costs to overcome the loss of face-to-face interaction. Given 
this, why do firms separate central administration from production? What firm 
characteristics are associated with this decision? Some guidance can be found in the 
literature of industrial organization, corporate culture, and urban economics (e.g. Aghion 
and Tirole, 1997; Cremer, 1995; Davis and Henderson 2003; Duranton and Puga, 2002; 
Eccles, 1998; Lovely, Rosenthal, and Sharma, 2002; etc.).  
While the literature on industrial organization and corporate culture does not 
address physical separation per se, several papers hint that there are potential managerial 
advantages in just separating the monitoring or evaluation authority from production 
plants. For example, in the theoretical work in Cremer (1995), under some conditions, a 
firm may choose optimally a lower level of monitoring ability, since a more accurate 
technology reduces the agent's incentive to work to signal high ability. Similar arguments 
can also be found in Aghion and Tirole (1997). In the context of spatial organization of 
firm, a firm’s choice of lower level monitoring technology could be reflected in its 
decision to physically separate administration from production.  
Another insight can be found in Eccles (1985), which discusses the idea that 
suspicion among plants about unfair treatment of some plants over others can corrupt 
incentive schemes of the firm. While it is not addressed in Eccles (1995), in the context 
of firms’ spatial organization, the remedy for such a problem could be to physically 
separate the evaluation authority from all the production plants. Such separation may be 
particularly important when firms are industrially diverse. For example, suppose a firm 
has two plants each producing different products. If one plant’s site is chosen for a firm’s 
administration as well, the plant whose site was not chosen may suspect that the firm’s   3
prime focus is on the other plant (for marketing or investing in fixed capital assets). Once 
such suspicion arises, this may discourage the manager of the plant without the 
administration. As another example, suppose a firm has plants that are geographically 
dispersed. If plants are geographically far apart, they may have little knowledge about the 
performance of other plants; this makes it difficult for a plant to see if the evaluation is 
fair by checking its performance relative to others. In such situation, locating the 
evaluation authority at a site of one of the plants may incur a risk of increasing the 
sentiment of unfair treatment. It is also possible that the separation of administration and 
production for a firm with geographically dispersed plants occurs so administration is 
placed to be able to reach all plants more equally. 
In the literature in urban economics and economic geography, there are several 
papers that do explicitly examine physical separation. In the earlier literature (Aksoy and 
Marshall, 1992; Ginzberg, 1977), administrative functions represented by headquarters 
were viewed as being primarily located in large metro areas such as New York and were 
viewed as in fact providing the economic base for such cities. As we point out in this 
paper, such views appear to take rather extreme position about the role of headquarters in 
some big cities. 
However, the modern urban economics literature provides some key insights, 
which are summarized in the notion of “functional specialization” introduced by 
Duranton and Puga (2002). Here, a firm may find it advantageous to locate production 
facilities in smaller (lower cost) and more specialized cities and set up its headquarters 
and administrative functions in a large diverse metro area with better availability, quality, 
and diversity of business and financial services. Such business and financial service 
inputs may be largely non-transportable, since design, purchase, and on-going usage 
require repeated face-to-face interactions between buyer and seller (Kolko, 1999). By 
locating a CAO in a large metro area within service concentrations and benefiting from 
the access to variety of services, a firm may be able to improve its overall productivity 
(Davis and Henderson, 2003; Ono, 2003). 
Moreover, a firm may want a CAO "representative" in large visible markets, in 
order to help market the firm and hence indirectly the firm's products. Such CAOs might 
gather information from other CAOs (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Lovely, Rosenthal,   4
and Sharma, 2001) as well as other types of representatives of other firms about market 
conditions domestically and internationally. 
As described above, the current literature provides some insights about a firm’s 
decision whether to physically integrate or split management and production across 
multiple locations. However, in the literature there is little known about the actual 
patterns of such spatial organization of firms. For example, while people have written 
about the role of headquarters in cities such as New York, relatively little is known about 
which firms have headquarters or other managerial and administrative offices, where they 
are located, what they do in cities, whether such offices are more permanent versus fluid 
in location choices, and the like. 
The goal of this paper is to document some stylized facts as a baseline for future 
theoretical and empirical work,
1 by presenting a variety of evidence on the nature and 
roles of CAOs. CAOs play a significant role in US economy, accounting for about 2.5 
million workers. However, such offices are created only by less than 5 % of US firms and 
these firms, as we will show, are very large. One key issue explored in this paper is 
among bigger firms, what firm characteristics and organization determine whether a firm 
has a CAO or not. A second issue concerns whether the notion of functional 
specialization as Duranton and Puga (2002) appears in the data. Do CAOs outsource and 
if so how important is that role? Is outsourcing just a substitute for activities that were 
performed in-house, or is there any evidence to suggest that in-house and outsourced 
activity complement to each other? Moreover, in terms of physical separation, CAOs are 
divided into those which are located next or near to production units and those which are 
not collocated with any production units. We will explore what firm characteristics and 
spatial structures are associated with a firm’s decision to collocate their CAOs or not. 
Given plants are dispersed and many CAOs are collocated with plants, one could also 
expect a high degree of spatial dispersion of CAOs. We will examine the extent of spatial 
dispersion versus the extent of clustering of CAOs in major metro areas such as New 
                                                 
1 The prototype we have described best fits manufacturing firms. However, it also applies well to retail 
firms, in which CAOs of a department store chain coordinate the functions of the “production facilities” 
spread over many small and large metro areas and purchase intermediate service inputs for the firm. A 
similar comment applies to the financial and banking sectors.    5
York and Chicago, and ask whether NY represents a “corporate control” center as 
envisioned by Ginzberg (1977). 
Finally, we turn to the topic of turnover – opening and closings – of CAOs, to see 
to what extent firms adjust the location of their administrative offices over time. Because 
CAOs support firms’ production activities, firms may change CAO locations to 
accommodate various changes in their production activity. It is also possible that a firm 
adjusts CAO locations based on its experience, as it learns the optimal spatial 
organization as a whole and locations that are suitable or not suitable in which to locate 
administrative functions.  
We will examine whether the rates and patterns of CAO turnovers are any 
different from those for production plants, by comparing our finding with Dunne, 
Roberts, and Samuelson (1988). As we show, CAOs are set up by large firms; thus we 
might expect set-up decisions to have a high degree of persistence. On the other hand, 
CAOs require low fixed capital and are potentially easier to relocate. Is there a suggestion 
in the data that firms experiment with CAO locations, for example, to find the best 
outsourcing places? 
  Below, we start with describing the details of the data and several stylized facts 
regarding CAO establishments and their firms. Then we turn to a more detailed 
examination of the questions and issues posed above. 
 
2. Data and Overview  
The main data sets we use in this paper are micro-level data from the Auxiliary 
Establishment Surveys (AES) and the Standard Statistical Establishments Lists (SSEL) 
compiled and organized by the U.S. Census Bureau. The AES is a census containing the 
CAO information while the SSEL is the list of all private establishments in the USA 
containing basic information such as location, industry, and total employment. Since the 
SSEL also provides the identifier of a firm with which each establishment is affiliated, 
the SSEL can be used to construct firm level characteristics. Such information can be 
linked to CAOs again using the firm identifier. We identify by firm the main production 
                                                                                                                                                 
   6
activity (industry), degree of industrial diversification, geographical relationship among 
production facilities and CAOs, the location where the main production activity is 
performed, and so forth.  
 
CAO as a part of auxiliary establishments 
The AES is performed every five years, to capture the activity of all auxiliaries of 
firms. Auxiliaries are establishments that do not perform production or transaction 
activities but manage, service, or support the activities of, and are physically separate 
from, other establishments in the firm.
2 Micro-level data are available in five-year 
intervals starting from 1977. 
Auxiliary establishments are classified by type such as central administration, 
R&D, computer data processing, communications, central warehouses, and trucking. 
While the survey scheme changes somewhat over time, in general, it asks for each 
establishment, both its function and the employment by several functions. Since the 
question regarding auxiliaries’ function was not asked in 1977 and since that item was 
subject to missing and incomplete responses in 1992, until 1997, we define a CAO as an 
establishment for which the joint category of management, administrative and clerical 
employees dominates each of the other employment categories.  In 1997, however, the 
micro data set contains missing variables for employment but not for function. Thus, for 
1997, we base our definition on the question regarding the main function reported by 
each auxiliary establishment. The classification of auxiliary establishment is shown in 
Table 1 for 1997. CAOs represent by far the largest category with 72.9% of the data. 
Note that we did not include as CAOs 4% of establishments in the data, which are highly 
specialized and engaged in only one function such as accounting, legal, advertising, or 
personnel. Rather we study CAOs, which, in addition to such functions, play a role of 
monitoring, evaluating, and coordinating other production units. Other major categories 
reported by auxiliaries are warehousing, trucking, and repair (13.9%). R&D and data 
processing together only account for 3% of auxiliaries.  
 
                                                 
2 Sales offices are not considered as auxiliary establishments in the Census. They are categorized in 
wholesale sector and covered under the Census of Wholesale Trade.   7
CAO and firm size  
Table 2 provides a basic view of firms that have CAOs in 1997.  Excluded 
entirely from Table 2 are about 5.1 million single establishment firms employing 44.3 
million workers (Census (2001b)). This leaves us 167,126 multi-establishment firms 
employing 58.5 million workers in 1997; these are the largest and generally older firms in 
the country. Of these multi-establishment firms, firms that have any type of auxiliary 
establishments are only 20,635 firms; this accounts for only 12.3% of multi-
establishment firms. However, in terms of employment, firms with auxiliaries account for 
65.4% of the employment of multi-establishment firms, employing, on average, 13.4 
times the employment and having 8.5 times as many production plants as a multi-
establishment firms without auxiliaries. Auxiliary establishments are there to service 
production activities of very large firms. As we can see in Column 3, most firms with 
auxiliaries have at least one CAO. 
The last column looks at what might be called “conglomerates,” firms that have 
plants in more than one industry, and auxiliaries serving more than one industry’s 
production activities.
3 These are 714 giant firms averaging over 13,580 employees each. 
In such a conglomerate firm, the average number of CAO per plant (.126) is lower than 
for all firms generally; however, each CAO of such conglomerate firms is much larger 
than the average size of CAOs. Conglomerates have bigger CAOs, each of which 
services more plants.  
 
CAO and kinds of production activities (industries) supported 
What kinds of production activities require firms to have stand-alone CAOs? 
Table 3 presents a breakdown of industry activities that CAOs support. As we can see, 
production activities that CAOs service seem to be concentrated in certain industries. In 
1997 about 44% of CAOs and 33% of CAO employment are affiliated with retailing 
activities, and about 21% of CAOs and 39% of CAO employment support manufacturing 
activities. Together, manufacturing and retailing account for 65% in terms of CAOs 
                                                 
3 The industry of a plant is defined by its one digit SIC (see Table 4). Auxiliaries report the predominant 
SIC of the within firm plants they serve. In cases of firms with multiple auxiliaries, we define as serving 
more than one industry the cases where at least two auxiliaries serve different 1-digit SIC industries.    8
counts and 73% in terms of  CAO employment, to be compared to their 44.2 % share of 
national private employment. CAOs are thus heavily associated with manufacturing and 
retailing, and the CAOs supporting manufacturing activities are much larger than CAOs 
supporting other activities.  
However, the activities relying on CAOs have changed over time. First, while the 
average employment size of a CAO (in contrast to production units) has risen over time 
in all industries, it has doubled for construction, business services, and other services. In 
terms of the number of CAOs, the fastest growing CAO sector between 1977 and 1997 is 
personal services.
4 In particular, in industries such as SIC 83 (residential living, job 
training, and day care), there are no CAOs in 1977 but almost 1,300 in 1997.  This may 
be a move from "mom and pop" operations to conglomerate production, with resulting 
development of CAOs.  
Finally, as columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 show, the growth of a given industry is not 
necessarily accompanied by a commensurate increase in the number of CAOs supporting 
the activity, suggesting heterogeneity across industries from an organizational perspective 
in both the spatial configuration and roles performed by CAOs in relation to the rest of 
the firm. 
 
3. The Role of CAOs in Outsourcing  
As noted in the introduction, the urban economics literature discusses the notion of the 
“functional specialization” with the idea that a primary role of CAOs is to outsource, or 
to purchase business and financial services for their production units. Here, we examine 
the extent of outsourcing. While in our data, the purchases of financial services are not 
"observed," (they are typically reflected in loan rates and contract terms, which are not 
available in our data), there is in the data information on some outsourced business 
services. The AES asks auxiliaries for their expenditures on services such as legal and 
accounting in 1992, and also advertising services in 1997. In Table 4, we report  
propensities to outsource for auxiliary establishments and CAOs, excluding those who we 
                                                 
4 Some transport and all utilities, FIRE, and communications were out of scope in 1977 but are included 
today.   9
suspect are not responding to the questions regarding outsourcing (for more details, see 
the footnote under Table 4).  
As one can see, in 1997, the outsourcing propensities of CAOs range from .55 to 
.64, and in both years, CAOs have greater outsourcing rates than all auxiliary 
establishments. This supports the idea that CAOs have a key outsourcing role as 
suggested in Duranton and Puga (2002). Moreover, our calculation based on data 
available in 1992 suggests this role is greater for CAOs that also identify as headquarters. 
For 1992, the questionnaire asks whether an establishment is a corporate headquarters, 
executive office or head office for the entire enterprise, although the questionnaire does 
not really define what is a headquarters. As the table shows, however, CAOs that claim to 
be “headquarters” have about 40% higher propensity to outsource than CAOs in general.  
In addition, the table shows that outsourcing propensities may be increasing over 
time. Comparing the numbers between 1992 and 1997 for legal and accounting, we see a 
rise in propensities, modestly for legal services and substantially for accounting. The 
technology in intermediary service suppliers, and expertise and confidence in the use of 
outsourcing could be improving, although greater use in 1997 could also reflect recovery 
from the recession that occurred earlier in the decade. 
In Table 5, for CAOs that report outsourcing in 1997, we report expenditures on 
outsourcing as a fraction of their wage bill. Expenditure rates differ considerably across 
the services, reflecting both the importance of the intermediate input in production and 
the extent of in-house versus outsourced activity. Overall, expenditures on accounting 
outsourced are equal to 13.4% of CAO wage bills and for legal it is 15.2 %, while 
advertising is a huge 36.6%. Advertising is the big-ticket item that must draw CAOs to 
cities offering high quality, diverse advertising firms. Not surprisingly advertising is 
more important for CAOs supporting retailing, compared to that supporting 
manufacturing. Outsourcing of advertising for retail CAOs is 59.5% of CAO wage bills, 
while it is 24.4% for manufacturing.
5 Given the extent of service outsourced and the need 
                                                 
5 An upper limit would be to look at the relative expenditures by Auxiliary establishments which outsource 
all three functions. A lower limit would be to look at the relative expenditures by auxiliary establishments, 
which outsource any function. In general, auxiliary establishments are heterogeneous, outsourcing either all 
3 functions or none.    10
for face-to-face interaction in service delivery, co-location with service providers may be 
important for CAO establishments (see Davis and Henderson, 2003; and Ono, 2003).   
In Table 6, we look at the issue of substitution and complementarity between 
outsourcing and in-housing. Outsourcing a particular function is often viewed as 
replacing in-house production of that function in the firm. However, Table 6-a indicates 
that CAOs that outsource a particular function have a 2 to 3 fold higher percentage of 
employees internally working at that function. A CAO’s practice of outsourcing a 
particular function seems to imply that the CAO itself, as part of monitoring, 
coordinating, and partnering with suppliers, must have a bigger not smaller in-house unit. 
In that sense of requiring in-house functions to support any degree of outsourcing, the 
two complement each other. 
We further look at the relationship between the extent of outsourcing and in-house 
activity, for just CAOs that outsource a particular function. Table 6-b presents the 
correlation coefficient between the share of employees engaged in a particular function in 
a CAO and the expense of outsourcing the function represented as a share of CAO wage 
bills.  Interestingly, we see that the correlation is very small, which indicates that beyond 
a fixed cost of in-house support to have any outsourcing, as outsourcing grows, there is a 
tension between substitution and complementarity of outsourcing and in-house activity. 
 
4. CAOs and Firm Structure 
Above, we have provided an overview of auxiliaries and CAOs, showing that CAOs are 
predominantly associated with larger manufacturing and retail firms. We examined basic 
statistics on outsourcing, an important function of CAOs. In this section, we take a closer 
look first at the firm characteristics that are associated with having a CAO, and then at 
the extent to which CAOs are physically separated from their production plants.  
  Why might firms physically separate out administration functions? First as firm 
activity at one location grows, administrative functions may reach a scale where they can 
no longer be housed in the plant. Moreover, separation removes administrators from the 
noise and pollution associated with production. Apart from this basic consideration, as 
discussed in the introduction, some papers in the literature on corporate governance and 
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corporate culture hint that there are managerial advantages in just separating the 
monitoring or evaluation authority from plants.  For example, as we mentioned in the 
introduction, Cremer (1995) suggests that, under some conditions, a firm may choose 
optimally a lower level of monitoring ability, since a more accurate technology reduces 
the agent's incentive to work to signal high ability (see also Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In 
the context of spatial organization, a firm may separate administration from production 
activities to indicate the choice of lower monitoring technology. It is also possible that 
not locating firm monitoring authorities with any plants helps remove suspicion among 
plants about unfair treatment of some plants over others. 
These reasons do not suggest that administration need be far removed from 
production. What are reasons for non-collocation? According to Duranton and Puga 
(2002) and Davis and Henderson (2003), firms might have incentives to separate their 
administration from production in order to locate the administrative offices closer to 
diverse intermediate service suppliers, which are highly concentrated in central cities. 
The proximity to suppliers facilitates face-to-face communication with suppliers, which 
is very important in purchasing services.
6  
Note that, as we will show later, of firms that have CAOs, 75% of them have 
CAOs only in counties where their production facilities are. We define CAOs as being 
collocated if they are in the same county as production units of the firm. This 75% 
collocation rate suggests that being close to production facilities is important for firms, 
although it is very possible that, within the same county, CAOs are located in downtown 
while production is in less-populated suburbs. In that sense, our definition of collocation 
in this paper is somewhat crude. However, it is still the case that locating the CAO in the 
same county does not significantly expand the variety of local intermediate services to 
which the firms have access.  
Finally, we note that firms might locate CAOs away from production units but not 
necessarily where there are good outsourcing possibilities. As discussed above, firms 
                                                 
6 Looking at service outsourcing behavior by manufacturing plants, Ono (2003) finds that production plants 
rely on their CAO for business services when the size of the local service market is large for the CAO and 
small for the plant.  
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with geographically dispersed plants, or that are industrially diverse, or larger, may 
require the authority for monitoring or evaluation to be separated from production, to 
improve the incentive of agents (plants). Non-collocation may help to enhance the 
independence of such authorities. However, it is also possible that firms, in order to 
coordinate production activities, need to locate CAOs centrally to all plants; such location 
may not necessarily be a large city.  
In Table 7, we start by reporting results from a probit analysis examining 
characteristics associated with firms that have CAOs, compared to those that don’t. This 
exercise is carried out for all firms in the USA with at least one production plant plus one 
or more other establishments of any kind (plants, sales offices, auxiliaries, retail outlets, 
etc.). Many of our intuitions are supported by the correlations in Table 7 for continuous 
variables. Table 7 shows the impacts on the probability of one standard deviation change 
in the variables; while, for dummy variables, it gives the impact of a switch from zero to 
one. For these exercises, we set the base probability at .0683, the predicted propensity of 
a firm with average characteristics (instead of .107, which is the observed propensity to 
have a CAO among all 167,126 multi-establishment firms).  
From the table, we can see that bigger firms are more likely to have CAOs. A 
one-standard deviation increase in firm employment and in the number of plants raises 
the base probability by .0587 and .0182 respectively. For the former, this is an 86% 
increase in the probability, a substantial impact. So, CAOs, as should be clear by now 
belong to bigger firms, but within bigger firms there is a lot of variation. 
First, as mentioned above and in the introduction, if plants of a particular firm are 
industrially diversified, then it may increase the need to separate an evaluation authority 
from any plant so as either to better coordinate across diverse activities or to avoid some 
plants suspecting unfair treatment. For firms with two or more plants we calculate a 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index of the degree of plant specialization across industries. This 
is the sum of squared shares of firm plant employment in the ten different industries. A 
higher HHI, thus greater industrial specialization, decreases the likelihood for a firm to 
have CAOs.  A one-standard deviation increase in the HHI, or degree of specialization, 
reduces the probability of having a CAO by .0256, a reduction from the base probability 
of 37%. Given that we control for the degree of geographical dispersion of production   13
activity, the statistically significant coefficient of HHI seems to indicate that even non-
spatial aspects that characterize firms are important in firms’ decisions concerning their 
spatial organization. 
Turning to spatial dispersion, having plants in two or more counties, as opposed 
to just one county, raises the probability of having a CAO by .0351, a 51.4% increase. 
Maximal distance between any two counties with plants raises the probability of having a 
CAO, as does an increase in the (weighted by number of plants in each county) average 
distance for firms with plants in three or more counties.
7 Firms with more geographically 
dispersed plants are more likely to have a CAO, possibly to locate administration to a 
central place to help co-ordinate spatially disparate activities.  
Now, we turn to examine an issue addressed in the recent urban economics 
literature. For firms with plants in two or more counties, we examine the association 
between the total employment of a county in which a firm has its dominant production 
activity (in terms of the firm’s plant employment at county level), and the propensity for 
a firm to have a CAO. Based on Duranton and Puga (2002), it is possible that, in bigger 
counties, more business services are locally available, and therefore there is less need for 
a firm to establish a separate CAO if its production facilities are already located in a large 
metro area. The county size at the dominant plant location may also represent the scope 
of information available as well as the degree of visibility.  As shown in the table, the 
coefficient is not significant, but is negative which is consistent with the story in 
Duranton and Puga (2002) and Rosenthal et al. (2001). As we discuss later, further 
evidence that supports this view is found. 
Finally, as noted earlier, industry matters. The base case is light manufacturing. 
Relative to that, wholesale and retail firms are much more likely to have a CAO – the 
                                                 
7 This is equivalent to calculating all pairwise distances among plants and averaging. The average distance 
between plants is Σi Σj dij / n(n-1) for all plant pairs i and j within a firm, and dij is the distance between the 
centroid of plant i’s county and the centroid of plant j’s county (dij=0 if two plants are located in the same 
county.). Instead of calculating pairwise distances among all plants and averaging, for computational 
performance reasons we calculate pairwise distances between counties in which a firm owns plants and 
take the average weighted by the number of plants in each county, i.e. for all county pairs k and m, [ Σk Σm 
Pk Pm dkm / n(n-1) ] where P is the count of the firm’s plants in the county.)  
   14
base probability rises from .0683 to .1007. Other industries such as construction, 
transport and utilities, business services, communications and FIRE in particular are 
much less likely to have a CAO.  
There may be a concern that the industry dummies included in our probit analysis 
only broadly control for industry specific factors that influence a firm’s propensity to 
separate administration. Especially within manufacturing sector, due to the varying 
degree of noise or unpleasant smell from production process, which would influence the 
propensity for a firm to separate administration, it would make sense to control for finer 
industrial categories. Thus, we perform the probit analysis including 2-digit level SIC 
dummies when the dominant production is manufacturing. The results remained 
qualitatively the same for all of the key variables.
8  
Note also that, in our sample, firms with only one plant are included only when 
they have at least one auxiliary establishment or CAO, since otherwise, they are not 
multi-establishment firms. This would increase the propensity to have a CAO for firms 
with one plant in our sample and may bias the coefficient of the number of plants 
downward. Thus, as another robustness check, we perform the same probit analysis by 
limiting the sample to firms with two or more plants, for which firms are included even if 
they do not have any auxiliaries. Column (3) in Table 7 shows the result of the probit 
with the new sample, which turned out to be qualitatively the same as that of probit with 
all of the multi-establishment firms. 
We have also performed Tobit analysis using the number of CAOs as a dependent 
variable. We found that factors that are positively (negatively) associated with a firm’s 
probability to have CAOs are also positively (negatively) associated with the number of 
CAOs that a firm has. However, we found that the maximum distance between counties 
with plants does not have a significant association with the number of CAOs, while it 
does in the probit. The difficulty in coordination or monitoring resulting from a particular 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 As for industry dummies, printing and publishing industries was shown to have a typical propensity of 
having a CAO among manufacturing industries. Industries that are shown to have greater propensities are 
petroleum, chemical, primary metal, stone and clay industries, and those which are shown to have lower 
propensities are furniture and industrial machinery. 
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plant being far from other plants may be overcome by creating a CAO, but increasing the 
number of CAOs does not further resolve the issue. 
Now, given that firms create CAOs, where do they tend to locate CAOs? When 
firms create CAOs, they do not necessarily locate them far away from their production 
facilities. As noted earlier, in our sample of firms with CAOs, only 25% have their CAOs 
in a county where they do not perform any production activities. The statistic is 
confounded by the fact that it would be usual for retail or service firms to have an outlet 
or store in their CAO county, given operating establishments are usually more numerous 
and smaller in these segments, and spread throughout a region for geographic coverage. 
However, there are various reasons why firms create CAOs only to locate them close to 
plants, some of which were discussed above. Thus, we next examine what kind of firms 
would create CAOs in a county where they do not perform any production activities, 
hereafter called a non-collocated CAO. 
Table 8 presents a probit analysis that examines characteristics associated with 
firms that have non-collocated CAOs, given the set of firms with CAOs. Here, for firms 
with any number of CAOs, we ask whether the firm has a non-collocated CAO. We use 
the same firm characteristics included in Table 7, but add a control for the total number 
of CAOs since the probability of having any particular type of CAO will increase when 
firms have more CAOs. We also performed the same probit analysis limiting the sample 
to firms with only one CAO, asking whether that CAO was co-located or not; these 
results are qualitatively the same as the ones in Table 8. 
As shown in the table, the probability that a firm has at least one non-collocated 
CAO increases in situations where the firm is industrially diversified and geographically 
dispersed. Such features may not only make it more necessary to physically separate 
monitoring and/or evaluation authorities from production activities, but may also require 
such authorities to be located more independently (thus non-collocated with all 
production facilities) as the firm structure becomes more complex. Again, it is worth 
noting that the evidence seems to suggest that the degree of industrial specialization – a 
non-spatial aspect – influences a firms’ spatial organization. As for the geographical 
dispersion of production activities, one could also interpret the coefficients as indicating 
that firms search for locations central to all plants.   16
We find the probability of having a non-collocated CAO increases when the firm 
has more of them. This could be just statistical, from having more draws on the 
possibility of non-collocation. However, this may also be due to the heterogeneity in 
functions that CAOs perform within a firm, as firm size grows. Some CAOs may be 
collocated to assist a particular plant, while others may be non-collocated in order to gain 
the access to diverse service available only in large cities. 
We find perhaps oddly that the coefficient of the number of plants is not 
significant while average plant size is negative and significant. Controlling for the 
number of plants, as the average plant size increases, CAOs seem to be located closer to 
plants. Big production activities may have some specific needs that require administration 
to be collocated. 
Lastly, we find that the firms whose production is located in larger cities tend to 
have more collocated CAOs. The coefficient is statistically significant. This is consistent 
with an outsourcing story where firms that have production facilities in smaller cities and 
rural areas would construct CAOs where the access to diverse service inputs is easier 
(Duranton and Puga, 2002). Large cities would also facilitate the access to information 
(Rosenthal et al., 2001) and improve the visibility of firms. Firms with production 
facilities in large cities have less need for a non-collocated CAO.  
 
5. CAOs and Their Location 
Here we turn to location patterns of CAOs and auxiliaries. Given common perceptions 
about cities such as New York, one might expect to see CAOs are highly spatially 
concentrated. However in the previous section, we saw that CAOs also tend to be tied to 
where their production facilities are. These plants are spatially dispersed and, as we will 
see, CAOs are somewhat spatially dispersed.   
Figure 1 gives the basic picture, in which, for each USA county, we plot the  
location quotient against the log of county employment for 1997. The location quotient is 
the ratio of the county’s share of national employment in CAOs to its share of national 
private employment, and indicates whether a county has a high or low concentration of 
an activity relative to its share of all economic activity. Many of small counties were 
suppressed in Figure 1 in order to meet the requirement for data disclosure; the figure,   17
however, reveals that there is vast diversity in the concentration of CAOs even within the 
counties of similar sizes, based on the distribution of counties that fall above or below a 
location quotient of one. We expected large counties to have high relative shares of 
CAOs. Yet we see that many mid-size counties also have high CAO location quotients.  
In sum, the patterns indicate possible heterogeneity whereby some CAOs are 
located in larger urban counties with concentrations of business services, and others co-
located near their production plants in smaller counties. As we discussed, there are 
various organizational and urban economic reasons to collocate or non-collocate CAOs 
with plants as well as to locate CAOs in large cities or not. The rather unexpected degree 
of geographical dispersion of CAOs seems to be due to the combination of such factors. 
 
Is the CAO concentration consistent with the traditional view? 
  Here, we check whether our data support the traditional view that CAOs have 
very high concentrations in the very largest cities, by focusing on presenting the statistics 
on New York and Chicago. The traditional view would espouse that, for a city like New 
York, CAOs are the source of New York’s economic life.  Table 6 provides a summary 
of CAO shares of these cities in 1997. The numbers in Table 6 confirm the view that no 
city, even a New York or Chicago, has a very high share of CAOs. The maximum share 
of any county in CAO employment is Cook County, which has just 3.02% of the CAOs 
as compared to its 2.29% share of national employment.  
Notice also that the high shares of New York in the business service sector. 
Compared to New York's 3% share of national CAO employment, New York has very 
high shares of national security brokers, advertising, legal, accounting, employment 
agencies, and management and public relations, which are, respectively, 24.5%, 14.7%, 
7.24%, 5.10%, 6.22% and 4.25%. While New York may be viewed as a “headquarters” 
capital, it really is a service capital. Put another way, based on our data, CAOs account 
for 4% of New York City's employment. A similar size service industry nationally, 
banking and securities (similar in terms of national sector employment size), accounts for 
14% of New York's employment. And advertising, legal and accounting services, whose 
national employment is about 80% in comparison to national CAO employment, account 
for 7% of New York's employment. Such service industries are much more concentrated   18
in New York than CAOs. This suggests CAOs and headquarters to some extent come to 
New York because of its service sector base, not the other way around. 
Chicago’s Cook county also has somewhat higher shares in business services, 
though not as high as Manhattan’s. Cook county, also with a 3.02% share of national 
CAO employment, has shares of national security brokers, advertising, legal, accounting, 
employment agencies, and management and public relations of 3.13%, 5.77%, 4.09%, 
3.39%, 3.98% and 4.60%.  
It is also worth noting that the data confirm that New York is a financial CAO 
capital. While its overall share of CAOs is modest (2.76%), it has a 26% share of 1997 
CAOs that support finance, insurance and real estate activities. While the average 
financial CAO size in New York is small as one can see from the table, it is possible 
large non-NY financial firms (increasingly) take the view that a presence in New York 
City is critical and choose to locate a CAO there as a result.
9  
In sum, the table seems to reject a view that headquarters provide the economic base for 
some big cities (Ginzberg, 1977; Aksoy and Marshall, 1992). 
 
6. Opening and Closing of CAOs  
So far, we have examined how a firm’s spatial configurations, in the sense of the 
separation between administration and production activities, vary across firms depending 
on different firm characteristics. We found that many firm characteristics – both spatial 
and non-spatial – are important determinants of firms’ decision where to locate their 
administration. Then, does a firm adjust the location of CAOs as its characteristics 
change over time, and/or as it learns, through the experience, the optimal places for 
administration or even the spatial organizational style suitable to its own organization? 
In this section, we study the events underlying any changes in firms’ spatial 
configurations, by focusing on the patterns of opening and closing of CAOs over time. 
                                                 
9 Note that we expected a large concentration of CAOs in Delaware as it is well known that many firms 
incorporate there. We did not find an exceptional concentration there, and confirmed with the Delaware 
Department of State that firms are not required by law to have a physical presence in the state in order to 
incorporate there. Firms can incorporate through a retained law firm, and we do observe a large relative 
concentration of law firms in Wilmington.     19
Since we have data by Census year, we identify the opening and closing of CAOs every 
five years by using establishment identifier.   
There are two establishment identifiers available in our data sets. One is called the 
Census File Number (CFN), which contains both a firm identifier and a within firm 
establishment number. Since it contains the firm identifier, the CFN of a particular 
establishment changes when the ownership of the establishment changes with mergers 
and acquisitions. The other is the Permanent Plant Number (PPN), which is an identifier 
associated with a physical location of the establishment such as a building or office suite.  
In previous studies, PPNs have been used to study entry and exit patterns in 
manufacturing (Dunne et. al., 1988). Manufacturing plants are generally tied to a specific 
location, given their fixed capital (that is often specific to the production of a particular 
good). Thus, when there is new PPN, it usually is a new production facility. At the same 
time, when a PPN disappears, it means the plant was shut down. CAO activities, on the 
other hand, are not tied to a particular office space, being generally less capital intensive. 
For example, a CAO when it moves its location from one office to another nearby may be 
given a different PPN, when there is not change in its basic function, size, and role. Thus, 
using the PPN to analyze dynamics of CAO activities poses issues. In addition, PPNs 
were only introduced into the CAO files only from 1987, where CFNs are available from 
1977. 
For these reasons, we use the CFN identifier to capture the opening and closing of 
CAOs. We identify an establishment as a new CAO when an establishment first opened 
as a stand alone administrative office (a new CFN that appears for the first time in the 
AES file and the new CFN is a CAO).
10 A CAO is identified as closed if it disappears 
from the data set. Using the CFN allows us to exclude counting local CAO moves within 
a county as a closing and opening event, since CFN identification numbers, used as a 
vehicle to track survey forms, are not in practice changed following within county 
address changes. However, since the CFN of a particular establishment changes 
following ownership changes, acquired CAOs are counted as new entrants. Below, for 
years where PPNs are available, we will also attempt to distinguish takeovers from 
                                                 
10 We do not include as new CAO those auxiliaries that report a switch in function from some other kind of 
auxiliary to a CAO.    20
genuine opening and closing. In particular, when the CFN of a particular CAO is changed 
but the PPN remains the same, we consider the CAO as “acquired (taken over)” by other 
firm.
11 Note that the range of industries covered in the economic censuses expanded over 
time. For example, FIRE was covered only from 1992. In order to avoid the influence of 
such changes in the coverage when capturing the opening and closing of CAOs, we focus 
on economic activities that are covered consistently between 1977 through 1997.
12 
Table 10 shows the overall opening and closing rates for any five-year period 
from 1977 to 1997. The opening rate between years t and t+1 is the ratio of the number 
of CAOs that appeared between years t and t+1 to that of existing (total) CAOs in year t. 
The closing rate between year t and t+1 is the ratio of the number of CAOs that 
disappeared between t and t+1 to that of the existing CAOs in year t.  
Both the opening and closing rates are fairly high in any five-year period; the 
opening rate is between 54% and 61%, while the closing rate is somewhat lower, between 
48% and 52%. These rates are much greater than the five-year entry rates of 40-42% and 
exit rates of 34-39%, calculated for manufacturing plants over the time period 1967-1982 
found by Dunne et al. (1988).
13 Given that CAOs have in general low fixed capital it may 
not be surprising to find the turnover of CAOs to be higher than that of manufacturing 
plants. However considering that these are the decisions of mature firms, a research task 
would be to identify why firms choose to open, close and presumably relocate their 
CAOs so frequently. 
The CAO turnover pattern is also characterized by an additional feature, reflecting 
perhaps the fact that these are decisions of mature firms. The employment of both new 
                                                 
11 Note that, in such a case, it is also possible that a CAO of a completely irrelevant firm by chance 
occupied the office space previously used for a CAO of a particular company. However, given numerous 
office spaces available, the probability of such event is marginal.  
12 Excluded from the study of opening and closing of CAOs, are those which support the activity of 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing ; transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services;  
FIRE; health services; educational services; and membership organizations. 
13 Note that in the comparison of our findings with those of Dunne et al., the definition of a firm differs. In 
this paper we use the legal definition of a firm, and as discussed above, a merger or a buy-out that results in 
the creation of a new legal entity is counted as an entry, and likewise for exits. This contrasts with the 
approach of Dunne et al., which counts each market a firm operates in as a separate firm.   21
and closed CAOs are quite large; new CAO employment comprises 35-39% of the total 
employment of pre-existing CAOs, and closing CAOs represents 28-39% of the overall 
CAO employment. This is again a contrasting feature to that of entry and exit of 
manufacturing plants, for which the size of entrants and exits are quite small. The output 
market shares calculated by Dunne et al. are 14-19% for entering plants and 15-19% for 
exiting plants. In another view, closing CAOs are on average 39-60% of the size of 
staying CAOs, with an increasing trend over time. In comparison, the exiting plants in 
Dunne et al. produce 31-37% of the output of the staying plant. Similarly, new CAOs in 
any five-year period have on average 48-56% of the employment of a pre-existing CAO, 
while the entering production plants in Dunne et al. on average produce 28-36% of the 
output of an incumbent plant. As noted above,  the openings and closings of CAOs are 
conducted by mature firms, so the large employment shares of entering and exiting CAOs 
may not be surprising.
14 Again one can make the argument that the CAOs with their low 
fixed capital requirements are more malleable, which makes the closing of large 
supporting offices relatively easier than for manufacturing plants.  
While we observe high turnover of CAOs, it is useful to consider how much of 
the CAO turnover is the result of firm entry and exit. In Table 11, we distinguish between 
the opening of CAOs by existing firms from those of new firms. We see that around 80% 
of new CAOs are set up by existing firms (Table 11 (1) a). We further attempt to break 
out how much of the opening of CAOs is due to ownership changes for pre-existing 
CAOs. As one can see, most new CAOs are those which are newly created (Table 11 (1) 
a-1). The observed high turnover rates of CAOs are not due to the ownership changes.  
Now, let us look at the size of new CAOs, distinguishing between those which are 
opened by existing firms and those which are opened by new firms. In Table 11 (2), we 
calculate the relative size of new CAOs as compared to the pre-existing CAOs. We can 
see that the size of new CAOs of existing firms is bigger than those created when new 
firms start. It is possible that existing firms are generally larger than new firms and thus 
require larger CAOs. However, it is also possible that existing firms are more confident 
                                                 
14 We also use employment as our size measure as opposed to production volume, since a supporting office 
such as a CAO does not produce a good per se. 
   22
in the success of a new CAO based on their experience and thus construct larger CAOs 
than new firms. 
 Again for the latest two periods, for which PPNs are available, we look at finer 
categories by dividing the new CAOs into those which are newly constructed and those 
which were previously affiliated with other firms. From the table, CAOs that are acquired 
from other firms are larger than CAOs that are newly constructed. For example, the 
category in Table 11 (2) a-2 is typically the result of a firm acquiring other firms, and the 
CAOs taken over are between 3.9% to 24% greater than pre-existing CAOs affiliated 
with the same firms. The same tendency is found for the category in Table 11 (2) b-2, in 
which the acquisition of CAOs is mostly due to two or more firms merging and creating 
another new firm. Given the difference in size of an acquired CAO in relation to a new 
CAO, acquiring firms may be able to benefit from the revealed attributes of the existing 
workers and location as demonstrating that it is a favorable place to operate a CAO.  
Next, in Table 12 we attempt to distinguish between CAO closures by continuing 
firms and by firms that exit.  60 to 70% of CAO closures are by firms that continue their 
operations (Table 12 (1) a). For firm closures that are mergers, CAOs sometimes remain 
and continue to operate under the new affiliation (Table 12 (1) b-2). When this happens, 
the CAOs are much greater in size than those which close, and even greater than existing 
CAOs which remain in operation under the same affiliation (Table 12 (2) b-2). This could 
indicate that acquiring firms select successful CAOs to remain in operation.  
In Table 13, we look at the pattern of closing of young CAOs by presenting the 
closure rate of CAOs that were opened in the previous period. The table shows that the 
rates of early closure presented here are somewhat higher as compared to the overall 
closure rate we saw in Table 10. The share of early closures by firms that continue to be 
in business is also somewhat greater than that calculated based on all CAOs closed in 
Table 12. However, as we can see by comparing Table 13 (2) and Table 12 (2), the size 
of closed CAOs relative to those which were kept in operation is bigger for the case of 
young CAOs. Young CAOs may be closed even if they are big. This may be an 
indication of some degree of experimentation a la Jovanovic (1982), but with 
experimentation in finding the optimal location for a CAO in relation to the needs of the 
firm. For example, firms may experiment with locations to find an optimal balance   23
between tasks of monitoring and coordinating on the one hand and outsourcing on the 
other.  
In Table 14, we keep track of the pattern of closings for CAOs created between 
1977 and 1982, and present how the closure rate changes as those CAOs age. We see that 
59% of the CAOs created during the 1977-82 period were closed during the subsequent 
five-year period. Of the CAO that survived until the next period, another 45% were 
closed during the second five-year period, and of those that survived until 1992, 40% 
were closed before 1997. In the end, only 10% of the cohort of CAOs that entered 
between 1977 and 1982 remained in 1997. One finding is that the CAOs that remain the 
longest were also largest in size when they were created. While firms may experiment in 
finding the optimal locations for their CAOs, it is possible that the size of CAOs at their 
entry reflect a firm’s prior conjecture on the success of CAOs.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to filling a void between theoretical models of 
internal firms’ spatial organization and the limited empirical study of this organization. 
As there are many firms that operate in multiple locations, by locating different functions 
in different areas, empirical work in this area is important to understand what causes the 
concentration of some functions (Duranton and Puga, 2002) and  what is the decision 
making mechanism behind a firm’s initial decision to separate some functions from its 
main physical location. 
Our focus in this paper is to present facts surrounding firms’ decisions to 
physically separate part of their administrative activities and construct stand alone central 
administrative offices - CAOs. As we showed, there are significant differences between 
firms with and without CAOs. We found that firms that own CAOs are much bigger than 
those without CAOs. CAOs are typically created to support manufacturing and retail and 
wholesale businesses of firms. Firms are more likely to have CAOs if they are more 
industrially diversified and more geographically dispersed, and if their main production 
facilities are in smaller cities. However, interestingly, even when firms decide to separate 
administration from production facilities, most firms locate their CAOs nearby.    24
  In addition to the cross-sectional differences between firms with and without 
CAOs, we also present facts surrounding the dynamics of the decision to open and close 
CAOs. We found that both opening and closing rates are high and the sizes of new and 
closed CAOs are large, possibly due to low fixed set-up costs. We also found some 
indications that in the process of opening and closing CAOs, firms go through some 
experimentation, to find the optimal locations for their CAOs and the optimal spatial 
configuration for the entire firm.   25
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Table 1: Function of Auxiliaries in 1997 
  Percentage of each 
function 
Total number of Auxiliaries  46,596 
CAO  72.9 % 
Warehousing, trucking and repair  13.9 % 
R&D 2.23  % 
Electronic data processing  .820 % 
Accounting, legal, advertising, or 
personnel* 
4.07 % 
Other, unclassified  6.11 % 
No answer (missing)                    N/A 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the 1997 AES. 
* Establishments in this category are engaged in only one of these four functions, thus is highly specialized.   29
Table 2: Who has Auxiliary Establishments and CAOs?  
Firms with at least one plant and auxiliaries   Multi-plant 
firms, No 
auxiliaries  
Total Firms  with 
CAOs 
Firms with mixed 
plants and mixed 
auxiliaries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of firms  146,491  20,635  17,908  714 
Avg. firm employment  138  1,855  2,042  13,580 
Avg. number of plants per firm   4.25  36.07 39.48 202.57 
Avg. employment per plant  32.50 47.05 47.25 58.82 
Avg. number of auxiliaries per 
plant* 
  0.285 0.267 0.211 
Avg. number of CAO per plant*      0.246  0.126 
Avg. employment per auxiliary    69.95  72.95  105.89 
Avg. employment per CAO      72.76  124.50 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the AES and the SSEL 
Note: excludes Alaska, Hawaii. Excludes firms with Auxiliary establishments but no plants in the 
contiguous USA and 28,470 listed "multi-establishment" firms with a single plant but no Auxiliary 
establishments. 
* The numbers were calculated by taking average of the number of auxiliaries/CAOs per plant 
calculated for each firm. 
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Table 3. Industries and CAOs 
 
 1977  1997  1977-1997  growth 
of 


























  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Agriculture  821 76 758  87  2.7  1.2  -7.7  32.1 
Construction  261 36 305  71  .87  5.4  16.9  54.4 
Manufacturing  6,192 122 7,139  136  29  17.1 15.3  -5.77 
Transport & utilities  N/A  N/A  1,243  77  3.9  4.6  N/A  67.4 
Retail & wholesale  12,424  47  14,901  54  33  27.1  19.9  61.3 




































Other services  1,532  25  5,960  52  12  23.6  289  131 
All  21,972 67 33,962  73  100  100 N/A   
Totals   1.46M.   2.47  M.         
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and the CBPs.   31
Table 4. Proportions to Outsource  
Percent of units outsourcing
3 
   Legal  Accounting  Advertising 
  Year  1992 1997 1992  1997  1997 
Auxiliary establishments
*  (1)  .436 .487 .299  .448  .424 
 CAOs
*  (2)  .544 .637 .377  .578  .545 
    HQs*  (3)  .741  N/A  .561  N/A  N/A 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES. 
* Because of changes in the way the micro-level data were edited, we use different criteria to identify 
establishments responding to the outsourcing questions. Auxiliary establishments that are included for the  
calculation of outsourcing propensities are those who respond to the function or HQ question for 1992, and 
those who respond to the function employment questions for 1997. 
 
 
Table 5. For Outsourcers, Ratio of Expenditures to Establishment Wage Bill 1997
1 
 
 Legal  Accounting  Advertising 
All CAO establishments  .152  .134  .366 
Manufacturing CAO establishments  .157 .119  .244 
Retail CAO establishments  .121  .157  .595 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the 1997 AES.
 
1 Calculated only for establishments reporting actual expenses (and wages).   32
Table 6. Outsourcing versus in-housing 
 
a. Average share workers working in-house for each function in a CAO employment 
 Legal  Accounting  Advertising 
CAOs that outsource the 
particular function 
.98% 26.01%  1.42% 
CAOs that does not outsource a 
particular function 
.28% 14.73%  .46% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and the CBPs. 
 
b. Relationship between the emphasis in in-house function and outsourcing, when CAOs 
outsource - Correlation between the share of employee engaged in a particular function in a 
CAO and the expense of outsourcing the function as a share of CAO wage bills –  
Legal Accounting  Advertising 
.0126 -.0306  .0803 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and the CBPs.   33
Table 7. Probit analysis: Does a firm have a stand-alone CAO?
5 (1997)  
 
 Probit  Tobit 
Dependent variable  =1 if a firm has CAOs  Number of 
CAOs  
  All multi-establishment firms  
(167,126 firms) 
Firms with two 
or more plants 







Effect of 1 s.d. 
change (for dummy 
variable, discrete 





 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












HHI of firm plants industrial 
specialization if two or more plants
1 






D2 = 1 if plants in two or  more counties     .281** 
(.0395) 




D2 * max. distance between counties 
with plants 
  .0000532** 
(.0000124) 




D3 * avg. weighted distance between 
plants
2 (D3=1 if plants in 3+ counties, 0 
otherwise) 
  .000129** 
(.0000233) 




D2 * ln (county employment of 
dominant firm county)
3 








Agriculture     .102** 
(.0520) 















(.187)   34






Retail wholesale      .237** 
(.0212) 
















Communication and motion pictures   -.172** 
(.0592) 










Constant   -1.372** 
(.0368) 





2 .218    .216  .135 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES, SSELs, and the CBPs. 
1)  The index is the sum of squared shares of firm plants' employment in the 9 industries in Table 4. 
2)  Distances are between centroids of counties. Weights are numbers of firm plants in each county. The 
measure is equivalent to the average of all pairwise distances between plants (where that distance is 
zero for plants in the same county). 
3)  The dominant county for a firm is the county with the plurality of firm plant employment. The variable 
is ln (total county private employment). 
4)  Excluded category is light manufacturing. 
( ): Huber/White/sandwitch robust standard error 
** is significant at 5% level. * is significant at 10% level.   35
Table 8. Probit Analysis: Does a firm has a non-collocated CAO? (1997) 
  17,908 firms 
 Probit 
Dependent Variable: =1 if a firm has a co-located CAO  Coefficient 
(Robust s.e.) 
ln (firm employment in plants)  -.139** 
(.00905) 
No. of CAO      .0259** 
(.0102) 
No. of plants     -.00007 
(.000136) 
Index of firm plant specialization if two or more plants
1    -.687** 
(.0433) 
D2 = 1 if plants in two or  more counties     1.164** 
(.0920) 
D2 * max. distance between counties with plants    .000244** 
(.0000292) 
D3 * avg. weighted distance between plants
2 (D3=1 if plants 
in 3+ counties, 0 otherwise) 
  .000178** 
(.0000627) 
D2 * ln (county employment of dominant firm county)




Agriculture     -.196** 
(.0937) 
Construction   -.873** 
(.115) 
Heavy manufacturing    -.0898** 
(.0453) 
Transport & utilities  -.232** 
(.0653) 




Business services  -.209** 
(.0545)   36
Communication and motion pictures   .0613 
(.107) 
Other services  -.673** 
(.0454)  




Source: Authors’ calculation based on the AES, SSELs, and CBPs. 
  1) Excluded category is light manufacturing. 
  ( ): Huber/White/sandwitch robust standard error  
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Table 9. CAO Activity in New York and Chicago 
1997 (Percent shares of nation total) 





NY & Chicago 
Share of national employment  1.84  2.29  4.05 
Share of CAOs  2.76  2.22  5.78 
Share of CAO employment  3.00  3.02  5.28 
Share of service CAOs  5.14  2.35  7.49 
Share of service CAO employment  4.56  2.87  7.43 
Share of FIRE CAOs   25.84  2.99  28.83 
Share of FIRE CAO employment  10.14  6.47  16.61 
Share of national employment In 
Selected service industries 
     Security brokers  
     Advertising 
     Legal 
     Accounting 
     Employment agencies 


















Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and the CBPs.   38
Table 10: Overall Opening and Closing Rates 1977-97 
 1977-82 1982-87 1987-92  1992-97
Opening rate  .540 .614 .562  .578
New CAOs employment share   .354 .385 .375  .374
New CAOs relative size  .479 .491 .534  .564
Closing rate  .481 .523 .480  .499
Closed CAOs employment share  .276 .362 .359  .387
Closed CAO relative size  .391 .510 .599  .600
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES. 
 
Table 11: New CAO and Firm Entry 
 1977-82 1982-87 1987-92  1992-97
(1) Share in terms of CAO counts   
a) Existing firms  .819 .766 .830 .783
a-1) Newly created  CAO   N/A N/A .776 .716
      a-2) CAO acquisition  N/A N/A .054  .067
   
b) New firms  .181 .234 .170  .216
     b-1) Newly created CAO   N/A N/A .136  .183
     b-2) CAO acquisition  N/A N/A .034  .033
   
(2) Relative size to stayer   
a) Existing firms  .540 .522 .530 .570
a-1) Newly created  CAO   N/A N/A .481 .526
      a-2) CAO acquisition  N/A N/A 1.243  1.039
   
b) New firms  .202 .391 .522  .523
      b-1) Newly created CAO   N/A N/A .365  .403
      b-2) CAO acquisition  N/A N/A 1.302  1.193
   
(3) Size of existing CAOs  102.45 103.23 89.56 94.64
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES. 
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Table 12: CAO Closure and Firm Exit 
  77-82 82-87 87-92 92-97
(1) Share in terms of CAO counts    
a) Firm remains  .653 .598  .633  .689
b) Firm closed (include merger and acquisition)  .347 .402  .367  .311
    b-1) CAO closed  N/A N/A  .301  .259
b-2) CAO taken over by other firms  N/A N/A  .066  .052
    
(2) Relative size to staying CAO  .391 .510 .599 .600
a) Firm remains   .403 .520  .670  .639
b) Firm closed (include merger and acquisition)  .370 .496  .475  .513
      b-1) CAO closed   N/A N/A  .329  .377
      b-2) CAO taken over by other firms  N/A N/A  1.134  1.197
    
(3) Size of existing CAOs  97.60 100.13 91.13 88.21
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and SSELs.
 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Five-year Closing Rates and Relative Size  
  1982-87 1987-92 1992-97 
(1) Total closing rates  .587 .540 .584 
a) Share firm stays  .627 .674 .750 
b) Share firm exits 
  .373 .326 .250 
(2) Avg. size relative to existing CAOs  .600 .771 .819 
a) Firm stays  .610 .803 .828 
b) Firm exits 
  .583 .649 .792 
(3) Avg. employment of survivor  64.93 58.05 54.36 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and the SSELs.
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Table 14: Length of Life for 1982 CAO Entrants
1 
     Average employment 
 Counts  Closing  rate
2 1982  1987 1992 1997 
Closed b/w 1982-87  6,950 .587 38.95       
Closed b/w 1987-92  1,927 .446 54.44  55.32     
Closed b/w 1992-97  851 .396 62.63 64.64  66.38   
Present in 1997  1,212 78.60  86.74 91.14 92.34 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES and the SSELs.
 
1There are 11,847 CAOs entering in 1982. The exits do not add up to this since the switch-outs* have been 
omitted. 
2 Conditional exit rate, i.e., the probability of exiting in cell, given that the CAO has survived until that cell.  
* In our sample we define a CAO as an auxiliary establishment whose greatest employment category is 
administrative employment. For most CAOs this holds true over the sample period, but in some occasions, 
CAOs change their employment composition sufficiently to switch their majority employment away from 
administrative employment (switch-out), and in some cases, the some auxiliaries switched in from having 
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Figure 1 
Log county total employment
 a county’s location quotient* withheld to avoid disclosing data of individual
companies













(Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AES.) 
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